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 Chapter 7 
 Wages 
 The two preceding chapters suggest that displaced manufacturing workers in 
Switzerland have comparatively good  reemployment chances – with the exception 
of the older  worker s. However, ﬁ nding a job  per se does not guarantee that dis-
placed workers will experience a successful  occupational transition after plant clo-
sure and that they can continue their  career s without major ruptures. Indeed, workers 
may have accepted major  wage losses . 
 The  human capital theory introduced by Gary  Becker ( 1962 ) suggests that wages 
represent returns on workers’  productivity . According to this logic, wage change 
following job change is an expression of how the new  employer values the workers’ 
skills as compared with the former employer. Wage losses can be the consequence 
of low  transferabilit y of the workers’ skills to a new employer. Accordingly, work-
ers who have skills that are very speciﬁ c to the former employer or sector 1 may 
experience larger wage losses upon reemployment than workers who mainly pos-
sess general skills that are transferable to any company or sector (Neal  1995 : 656). 
The share of speciﬁ c skills as compared with that of general skills is higher for 
workers who have completed on-the-job training or worked in the same company 
for many years. We therefore expect that the high-tenured, the low-qualiﬁ ed and 
workers who changed sector or occupation are most strongly affected by wage 
losses (hypothesis H6, see Sect.  1.4 ). 
 An alternative explanation has been provided by the signaling  theor y, which sug-
gests that episodes of unemployment are signals of job candidates’ low productivity 
to potential employers (Spence  1973 ). Accordingly, employers are likely to offer 
job seekers wages which are below their pre-displacement wage. Finally, wage 
losses can be a result of skill depreciation in a long phase of unemployment 
(Arulampalam  2001 : F603; Flückiger  2002 : 15). Based on these arguments, in the 
1  Such speciﬁ c skills may be the knowledge required to use machines or software that are only used 
in a particular sector or contacts with the clients and markets of a particular ﬁ rm. This knowledge 
may be important in the workers’ pre-displacement ﬁ rm, but if the worker changes job his or her 
skills and contacts may be of little use to the new  employer . 
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second part of hypothesis H6 we expect that workers who were unemployed for a 
long period experience substantial wage losses. 
 In this chapter we start by examining the wage distribution before and after dis-
placement. We present our results of average wage changes for displaced workers 
and in comparison with the  control group of non-displaced workers in the Swiss 
Household Panel. We then analyze the factors that are linked to wage losses. 
7.1  Wage Distribution Before and After Displacement 
 We start with the presentation of the distribution of workers’ wages. In Table  7.1 we 
show the distribution before and after displacement. This analysis is mainly based 
on a question asked in the survey on workers’ precise gross monthly pre- and post- 
displacement wage. 2 
 Standardizing wages for 40 h per week and 12 monthly salaries per year, 3 we ﬁ nd 
that wages under CHF 4000 – which corresponds to 66 % of the Swiss national 
median wage for all sectors and positions – were less frequent before displacement 
than after. Before the plants closed down, 6 % of the workers earned CHF 4000 or 
less for a full-time job of 40 h per week. After the closure, 9 % did – among the 
2  Information about wages is sensitive data and its assessment is often subject to  measurement 
error . As discussed in Chap.  2 , a strategy to address this issue was to use register data. An analysis 
of the measurement error in fact revealed that the data collected with the survey deviates by about 
2 % from the register data. However, register data is only available for 365 (30 %) of the 1203 
workers in our sample and the information presented in Table  7.1 is thus approximate. 
3  The 13th monthly wage was included in the calculation if workers declared having had one. 
 Table 7.1  Distribution of 
gross monthly wages before 
and after displacement in 
CHF (standardized for 40 h 
per week and 12 salaries per 
year) 
 Before displacement  After displacement 
 5 %  4000  3111 
 10 %  4409  3702 
 25 %  5159  4190 
 50 % 
(median) 
 6000  5700 
 75 %  6950  6857 
 90 %  8450  8457 
 95 %  10,850  11,429 
 Mean  6220  6039 
 N  749  401 
 Reading example: 5 % of the workers earned CHF 4000 or less 
before displacement. After displacement, 5 % of the workers 
earned CHF 3111 or less 
 Note: Before displacement the median wage was close to the 
Swiss median of CHF 5979 
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subgroup of workers who found a job. At the top end of the wage distribution there 
was no signiﬁ cant change: before displacement 2.4 % of the workers earned CHF 
10,000 or more, after displacement this was the case for 3 % of the workers– which 
is not signiﬁ cantly different. In parallel, the median wage fell from CHF 6000 to 
CHF 5700. 
 Compared to the situation before displacement, the wage distribution has become 
more unequal: the relation between the wage at the 95th and the 5th percentile (p95/
p5) has increased from 2.71 to 3.67, at the 90th and the 10th percentile (p90/p10) 
from 1.92 to 2.02 and at the 75th and the 25th percentile (p75/p25) from 1.35 to 
1.38. The plant closures thus seem to have increased the  inequality in workers’ 
wages. This ﬁ nding may also reﬂ ect the fact that the wages of high income earners 
have generally risen whereas wages at the bottom end of the wage distribution have 
either stagnated or decreased. 
 Since only a proportion of the displaced workers have searched for a job and 
been reemployed, we have almost twice as many observations for the wages before 
displacement as after displacement. Accordingly, in Table  7.1 we compare two dif-
ferent subsamples and this gives us only limited information about changes in the 
individual workers’ earning situation. We therefore continue with an individual- 
level analysis of the wage change, focusing on the reemployed workers. 
7.2  Average Wage Change 
 We start with the analysis of the  average wage change. In order to produce results 
that are comparable with earlier ﬁ ndings in the literature, we examine wage changes 
in four different ways. First, we compute the changes exclusively for the reem-
ployed workers – measuring the difference between pre- and post-displacement 
wage and then calculating the average wage change as has been done for example 
in the study by Bender et al. ( 2002 : 56). Second, we measure wage change for reem-
ployed and unemployed workers together – replacing the unemployed workers’ 
income with zero as has been done in several studies from the US (e.g. Jacobson 
et al.  1993 ) or by Balestra and Backes-Gellner ( 2016 ) for Switzerland. 4 Third, we 
analyze wage change only for workers in our sample with two and more or ﬁ ve and 
more years of  tenure , respectively. This allows us to compare our results with 
American studies based on the Displaced Worker Survey (DWS). 
 Fourth, we compare our results with workers from the Swiss Household Panel 
who did not lose their job in 2009. 5 We assess their wage change over time by 
4  We carry out this analysis only for the purposes of comparison with other studies. The large major-
ity of Swiss workers do not face an income of zero in the case of unemployment. Instead if they 
claim  unemployment beneﬁ ts they obtain between 70 and 80 % of their former wage for workers 
with dependent children or a pre-displacement wage below about 60 % of the median wage). 
5  The workers in our sample were matched to workers in the SHP by means of radius caliper  pro-
pensity score matching with a radius of 0.001, based on the socio-demographic characteristics sex, 
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 following them through 2011. This approach allows us to make a difference-in- 
difference analysis that considers how wages would have evolved if the workers had 
not been displaced. This  control group provides us with a counterfactual and thus 
enables us to make a causal interpretation of our ﬁ ndings about workers’  wage 
losses after redundancy. 
 As a ﬁ fth option, some authors use log post-displacement wages as the depen-
dent variable in order to take account of the fact that the same absolute amount of 
wage loss is larger in relative terms for workers with low pre-displacement wages 
than for those with high pre-displacement wages (e.g. Zwick  2012 : 15). We do not 
follow this approach since our dependent variable is wage  difference between the 
pre- and post-displacement job rather than the post-displacement wage used by 
Zwick ( 2012 ). However, we use the percentage difference to take this issue into 
consideration. 
 The following analysis is based on a combination of survey and register data for 
the pre-displacement wage and on survey data only for the post-displacement wage 
since for the latter measure there was no register data available. Table  7.2 shows that 
the displaced workers who were reemployed at the moment of the survey experi-
enced, on average, an inﬂ ation-adjusted wage loss of 4 %. The result remains 
unchanged if we include only workers with pre-displacement tenure of more than 2 
years into the analysis. If we calculate the wage difference between the job before 
and the job after displacement for reemployed workers who were tenured more than 
5 years in their former plant, we ﬁ nd slightly larger wage losses of 5 %. For the 
reemployed and unemployed workers together the average wage loss amounts to 
29 %.
education, age and sector. Our calculation is based on workers who were employed in 2009  and 
2011 – in order to assess their wage  differential – whereby some of them may have changed job 
while others have remained in the same job. Only full-time workers who worked at least 35 h a 
week were included in the analysis. Wages in both the treatment and the  control group were stan-
dardized for 40 h per week (see Chap.  2 ). 
 Table 7.2  Difference in wages before and after displacement for different worker subgroups 
 Difference 
before-after 
 Difference before- 
after for  tenure of 
2 years and more 
 Difference before-after for 
tenure of 5 years and more 
 (1) Reemployed  −4 % (n = 377)  −4 % (n = 341)  −5 % (n = 253) 
 (2) Reemployed and 
unemployed 
 −29 % (n = 468) 
 (3) Non-displaced 
(SHP) 
 +2 % (n = 1444) 
 Note: The wages are inﬂ ation-adjusted. Consumer prices in Switzerland rose by 0.7 % between 
2009 and 2010 and 0.2 % between 2010 and 2011 ( OECD Statistics). Reading example: The aver-
age wage loss of the reemployed displaced workers is 4 %. If we take only the reemployed dis-
placed workers with 5 and more years of  tenure into account, their average wage loss is 5 % 
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 Over the period of the study the wages of our control group of  non-displaced 
workers in the Swiss Household Panel (SHP) increased by 2 %. Consequently, if we 
compare the change in wages of the  displaced workers with the  non-displaced , we 
ﬁ nd that the reemployed displaced workers lost on average 6 % of their wages by 
having been laid off – without counting wages foregone in possible phases of 
unemployment. 6 
 As the  control group , constructed based on the Swiss Household Panel, differs 
from the treatment group in terms of education and sex – as discussed in Chap.  2 – 
we test the robustness of the  control group by using data from the Swiss Federal 
Ofﬁ ce of Statistics on the evolution of real wages (corrected for inﬂ ation). 7 We 
compare the real wage change between 2009 and 2011 of the control group with the 
wage change of the entire working population of Switzerland over the same period. 
Between 2009 and 2010, real wages in Switzerland increased by 0.1 % and between 
2010 and 2011 by 0.7 %. Taking the period from 2009 to 2011 together, the increase 
was 0.8007 %. As Table  7.2 above shows, the real wage increase of the control 
group was 2 % over the same period and thus higher than for average Swiss workers. 
Using our control group, we therefore may overestimate the counterfactual wage 
increase – the increase of the displaced workers’ wages if they had not been dis-
placed. Accordingly, considering the real wage change of the entire Swiss working 
population, we ﬁ nd that displaced workers experience  wage losses of 4.8 % – instead 
of 6 % as computed based on the SHP control group. 
 How do our results compare with earlier ﬁ ndings in the literature? We ﬁ rst look 
at studies that assess the wage changes for reemployed workers without comparing 
them with a control group. Abe et al. ( 2002 : 236) examining wage losses of dis-
placed workers in Japan, ﬁ nd that male workers who were displaced in 1995 expe-
rienced on average wage losses of 4 %. Carrington ( 1993 : 443), who analyzes data 
from the US Displaced Worker Survey, reports wage losses of 12 %. The ﬁ ndings 
from Japan are close to our own results for Switzerland, while post-displacement 
wage losses in the US are much larger. A possible explanation for the high wage 
losses reported by Carrington may be that the Displaced Worker Survey includes 
only workers with more than 3 years of tenure. However, even if we take workers’ 
tenure into consideration, we ﬁ nd substantially lower wage losses than this US 
study. 
 Carneiro and Portugal ( 2006 : 15–6) measure wages losses of displaced workers 
in Portugal who managed to get back into the labor force and compare them with a 
non-displaced control group. The authors ﬁ nd that the workers’ wages decreased by 
4 % between the year before and the year after displacement. A German study that 
follows the same approach reports wage losses of a similar extent:  Burda and 
6  The ﬁ ndings from our survey regarding the wage differences for different  tenure categories can-
not be compared to the data from the Swiss Household Panel as in the Panel different tenure cat-
egories are used. 
7  Bundesamt für Statistik. T 39 Entwicklung der Nominallöhne, der Konsumentenpreise und der 
Reallöhne (1939–2014).  http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/de/index/themen/03/04/blank/
data/02.html 
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 Mertens ( 2001 : 30) ﬁ nd losses of 3 %. These results are similar to our own ﬁ nding 
of 6 %. In contrast, a study that uses this approach based on US data again reveals 
much larger losses of 12 % (Farber  1997 : 112). 
 Finally, some studies assess displaced workers’ wage losses by considering 
reemployed and unemployed workers, setting the unemployed workers’ post- 
displacement wage at zero and comparing the outcome to non-displaced workers. 
Based on this approach, Jacobson et al. ( 1993 : 697) report 25 % wage losses for 
high-tenured workers in Pennsylvania 6 years after displacement. A study that fol-
lows the same analytical procedure but uses data from Connecticut ﬁ nds losses of 
32 % (Couch and Placzek  2010 : 585). A Swiss study focusing on involuntary job 
losses in general – which is a much broader category than displaced workers – ﬁ nds 
losses of 17 % 1 year after job loss and 16 % 4 years after job loss (Balestra and 
Backes-Gellner  2016 : 13). The losses are thus comparable to our own survey. 
 Overall, the wage losses are substantially larger in the US context. What might 
explain these different outcomes in terms of wage losses in the United States com-
pared to Europe? A ﬁ rst reason is probably that the US Bureau of Lab or Statistics 
has deﬁ ned displaced workers as high-tenured adults who, after holding a job for 3 
years or more, lost that job (Fallick  1996 : 6). This deﬁ nition has been integrated into 
the major US surveys such as the Current Population Survey and the Displaced 
Worker Survey (Devens  1986 : 40). Some authors have used less or more restrictive 
deﬁ nitions: Fallick ( 1993 : 319) focused on displaced workers whose job  tenure was 
at least 1 year and Jacobson et al. ( 1993 : 689) on workers with more than 5 years of 
tenure. Such restrictions are not made in most European (or Japanese) studies. 
Displaced workers analyzed in US studies are thus a more selective group who are 
much more attached to their ﬁ rms – because of higher tenure – and therefore may 
ﬁ nd it more difﬁ cult to ﬁ nd as good a job match as they did in their old job. However, 
as our own analysis suggests, this factor alone does probably not explain the consis-
tently larger  wage losses in US than in European (or Japanese) studies. 
 Another potential explanation for the differences between US and European 
studies lies in institutional factors such as unemployment beneﬁ ts. Low replace-
ment rates and short beneﬁ t durations – as is the case in the United States – may 
compel displaced workers to ﬁ nd a job quickly, and force them to reduce their res-
ervation wage more strongly (Gangl  2004 : 174; Lentz  2009 : 50; Feather  1997 ). 8 In 
addition, it has been argued that in the US unionized ﬁ rms provide workers with 
rents which are lost upon job loss (Jacobson et al.  1993 ). Finally, differences in 
wage losses may also be due to differences in the business cycle. Appelqvist ( 2007 : 
26–7) found for Finland earning losses of 9 % in a period of  recession but zero 
losses in a situation of economic growth. Similarly,  Farber ( 1997 : 101) or  Kletzer 
( 2001 ) ﬁ nd that losses are larger in economic  downturn s than in boom phases. 
8  The  OECD has developed measures to compare unemployment beneﬁ t entitlements across coun-
tries. We consider the net replacement rate in 2012 for an unemployed person having earned before 
job loss a wage at the national average, being the main breadwinner and having two children. The 
net replacement rate for the United States was 43 %, for Finland 65 %, Germany 70 % and 
Switzerland 86 %. 
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 A problem that likely arises in our way of calculating wage losses is the fact that 
we assess the workers’ pre-displacement wage directly before displacement. As 
scholars have pointed out, this way of calculating probably underestimates the 
workers’ wage losses as many companies reduced their workers’ wages when they 
started having economic difﬁ culties (Jacobson et al.  1993 : 691; Arulampalam  2001 : 
F587; Carneiro and Portugal  2006 : 13). 
 Indeed, for the plant in our sample located in Biel we know that this happened: 
workers accepted wage cuts 1 year before the closure in order to enhance the plant’s 
chances of continuing to operate. If we compare the median pre-displacement wage 
of the (matched) workers in our sample with the workers in the Swiss Household 
Panel we ﬁ nd a lower value for workers in our sample (CHF 6239) than for workers 
in the SHP (CHF 6667). This supports the argument that displaced workers experi-
enced wage cuts – or periods of wage stagnation – before the plant closure 
happens. 
7.3  Distribution of Wage Change 
 So far, we have analyzed the reemployed workers’ average wage change. We now 
turn to the examination of how the wage changes are distributed among the reem-
ployed workers. We start out with the computation of the wage changes in percent-
ages, based on the precise assessment of workers pre- and post-displacement wage. 
We then collapse the individuals into seven categories as presented in Fig.  7.1 . On 
the side of the workers who experienced wage losses, we ﬁ nd that 14 % of the work-
ers experienced large wages losses of over 20 %. Twenty percent of the workers 
experienced intermediate wage losses of between 10 and 20 %. Twenty four percent 
experienced small wage losses of between 1 and 9 %. Five percent of the workers 
experienced almost no change in wages, earning 1 % more or less in their new job 
as compared to their old job. On the side of the workers who experienced wage 
gains, 20 % experienced small wage gains of between 1 and 9 %. Ten percent 
 Fig. 7.1  Distribution of wage difference (based on numerical assessment of workers’ wages) of 
the reemployed workers. N = 387. Reading example: 14 % of the reemployed had wage losses of 
20 % or more in their new job relative to their pre-displacement job 
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experienced intermediate wage gains of between 10 and 20 %. Seven percent expe-
rienced large wage gains of over 20 %.
 In a nutshell, the proportion of the reemployed workers who experienced wage 
losses is clearly larger (58 %) than the proportion of those who experienced wage 
gains (37 %). If we focus on the substantial wage changes of 10 % and more, we ﬁ nd 
that twice as many workers experienced strong wage losses (34 %) as strong wage 
gains (17 %). At the same time, for about a seventh (14 %) of all reemployed work-
ers the losses were larger than 20 % and thus very substantial. 
 Workers who were (still or again) unemployed when we surveyed them are not 
included in this analysis. It is likely that, if these workers managed to ﬁ nd a job after 
our survey, they experienced, on average, wage losses – as long unemployment 
durations may act as a signal of low  productivity for  employer s and the workers’ 
skills may depreciate during a long spell of unemployment. Accordingly, we con-
sider the unemployed workers together with those who experienced strong wage 
losses to be the most negatively affected workers after a plant closure. 
 The surveys conducted by  Weder and  Wyss ( 2010 : 38) in Switzerland and by 
 Jolkkonen et al. ( 2012 : 91–92) in Finland ﬁ nd that about a third of the reemployed 
workers experience a wage increase and about a third a decrease. Thus the compari-
son shows that workers in our survey experienced larger losses than workers exam-
ined in these other studies. While these surveys were conducted in a context of 
economic growth, ours was carried out in a phase of economic  downturn . The higher 
proportions of workers experiencing wage losses in our study may thus stem from a 
more adverse labor market situation. 9 
 In a next step we analyze the question put to the survey respondents of whether 
their current wage was much lower, slightly lower, about the same, slightly higher 
or much higher than their pre-displacement wage. The advantage of this measure is 
that a larger number of workers were willing to answer this question as compared 
with the more sensitive question about their wage in a numerical format (n = 495 as 
compared to n = 387). 
 Figure  7.2 shows that 22 % of the reemployed indicated their post-displacement 
wage as being much lower and 23 % as slightly lower than their pre-displacement 
wage. 13 % of them earned – according to their own assessment – about the same, 
31 % slightly more and 11 % much more than before their plant closed down. If we 
compare the proportion of workers who experienced wage losses with the propor-
tion of workers who experienced wage increases, 45 % earned less than before dis-
placement and 41 % earned more. Accordingly, the losses and gains are balanced 
although the proportion of workers who indicated a strong wage decrease (22 %) is 
clearly larger than the proportion who indicated a strong increase (11 %).
 Comparing the results from Figs.  7.1 and  7.2 suggests that either the higher num-
ber of survey responses changed the composition of the workers and accordingly 
the distribution of wage change or that those workers experiencing  wage losses 
tended to indicate a better – or positively biased – wage development than they actu-
9  Interestingly, however, our results do not greatly differ from the studies by Weder and Wyss 
( 2010 ) and Jolkkonen et al. ( 2012 ) in terms of the post-displacement  reemployment rate. 
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ally experienced. With respect to the latter option, it is remarkable that the share of 
workers who indicate a wage increase is similar in Figs.  7.1 and  7.2 (37 % vs. 42 %). 
There is however a stronger difference between Figs.  7.1 and  7.2 with respect to 
wage losses (58 % vs. 45 %). 
 This result is surprising in the light of the prospect theory, developed by Tversky 
and  Kahneman ( 1992 ), which suggests that the same amount of objectively mea-
sured (e.g. ﬁ nancial) losses and gains do not have the same effect on the – subjec-
tively perceived – decrease and increase in utility. In contrast to the conventional 
utility theory, prospect theory suggests that individuals are negatively biased and 
experience losses as a stronger burden than gains provide an advantage. If this 
mechanism were at work in our ﬁ ndings, we would observe that in Fig.  7.2 “much 
lower” and “slightly lower” wages are overrepresented as compared to Fig.  7.1 . This 
does however not seem to be the case. For this reason, the other option, namely that 
the fact that individuals who responded to the question represented in Fig.  7.2 more 
frequently experienced positive changes than respondents to the question repre-
sented in Fig.  7.1 , seems to be more plausible. 
7.4  Determinants of Wage Change 
 Earlier research has shown that different worker subgroups are affected unequally 
by wage changes. If we analyze wage change in categories by different socio- 
demographic characteristics, we ﬁ nd the largest differences according to age. 
Figure  7.3 shows that the large majority of the youngest cohort earn more after 
displacement: 39 % of them answered that, as compared with their pre-displacement 
job, their post-displacement wage was much higher and 37 % of them that it was 
slightly higher. In contrast, the majority of the two oldest age cohorts earned less 
after  reemployment than before: 36 % of the workers aged between 55 and 59 
earned much less and 34 % earned slightly less than before displacement. With 
 Fig. 7.2  Distribution of perceived wage change of the reemployed workers. N = 495. Note: This 
ﬁ gure represents the answer to the survey question: “As compared to your pre-displacement job, 
your current wage is …” Reading example: 22 % of the reemployed indicated earning much lower 
wages in their new job relative to their pre-displacement job 
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respect to the workers aged over 60, 61 % earned much less and 28 % slightly less. 
For the age cohorts in between, the wage change was gradually linked to age: the 
older the cohort, the larger was the proportion of workers who experience wage 
losses and the smaller the proportion of workers who experience wage gains. If we 
use instead the other wage difference variable where we constructed the difference 
by subtracting the current wage from the former wage, we obtain slightly different 
results, but the pattern that wage losses increased with age remains the same.
 However, this age difference may possibly be explained by the workers’ tenure. 
In fact, the theory suggests that, with longer  tenure , workers accumulate more ﬁ rm- 
speciﬁ c skills that do not generate ﬁ nancial  returns in a new company (Cha and 
Morgan  2010 : 1145). Moreover, it has been argued that ﬁ rms reward seniority by 
paying wages for workers with higher tenure that are higher than their  productivity , 
while younger workers are paid below their productivity (Daniel and Heywood 
 2007 : 49). In the case of a job separation, the seniority and consequently the senior-
ity bonus are lost and the workers thus experience  wage losses . 
 We argued that the change in workers’ wages may be linked to their level of 
education, their pre-displacement  tenure , the duration of a potential spell of unem-
ployment and whether they changed occupation. We test these hypotheses by run-
ning an OLS regression on inﬂ ation-adjusted percentage wage change with these 
variables, controlling for age, sex, collar, nationality, 10 district unemployment rate 
and plant. 11 
10  We use here a proxy based on workers’ surnames. 
11  In contrast to the last section, we now use the wage difference measure that indicates the percent-
age wage change for each individual. We use this measure in order to have a linear instead of an 
ordinal dependent variable. 
 Fig. 7.3  Distribution of perceived wage difference of the reemployed workers by age. N = 489. 
Note: This ﬁ gure represents the answer to the survey question: “As compared to your pre- 
displacement job, your current wage is …”. Shares of less than 5 % were not labeled in the ﬁ gure. 
Reading example: 61 % of the reemployed over 59 years had in their new job a wage that was much 




 Since not all displaced workers found a new job, the analysis of change in wages 
is likely to be affected by  selection bias . We test for this risk by using a Heckman 
selection correction analysis, using education as an instrumental variable (results 
not shown). 12 The results suggest that selection into employment is not a major 
problem for our analysis of wage change (i.e. we obtain similar ﬁ ndings without the 
selection correction). 
 The results are presented in Fig.  7.4 . The regression results conﬁ rm the descriptive 
ﬁ ndings from above that age has a negative effect on wage change. Compared to 
women, men’s wage reduction was about 7 percentage points larger.  Blue-collar work-
er s experienced 4 percentage points larger losses than  white-collar worker s. With 
respect to the nationality proxy we ﬁ nd that workers with surnames from non- EU 
countries experienced a wage drop that is about 4 percentage points greater than for 
workers with local surnames. Workers from Plants 3 and 4 experienced wage increases 
that are 8 percentage points higher than those in the reference category (Plant 1).
 We now turn to the independent variables of interest. As expected, long unem-
ployment durations are associated with negative wage changes. Workers with inter-
mediate unemployment duration of 3–12 months experienced a  wage loss of 5 
percentage points relative to workers who found their new job within 2 months. 
Workers who were unemployed for more than 12 months lost 11 percentage points 
in wages as compared to workers who found their job within 2 months. This ﬁ nding 
may be due to the negative effect of long unemployment durations on workers’ post- 
displacement wages – because of skill depreciation in long spells of unemployment 
or a negative signaling effect of such spells. Alternatively, it may also be due to a 
selection effect: the most dynamic and productive job seekers leave unemployment 
ﬁ rst, the least dynamic and productive workers last (Machin and Manning  1999 : 18). 
 The next independent variables we consider are change of sector and change of 
occupation. Changing sector means that workers were reemployed in the services, 
while changing occupation means that workers were reemployed in a different 
ISCO 1-digit occupation category than the one in which they worked before dis-
placement. With respect to change of sector we only distinguish between service 
and  manufacturing sector since the literature suggests that this distinction matters 
most with respect to wage (Jacobson et al.  1993 ). We do not ﬁ nd a statistically sig-
niﬁ cant effect for change of sector. In contrast, we change of occupation is signiﬁ -
cant although it is relatively small. The result suggests that workers who are 
reemployed in a different occupational group experienced a 3 percentage points 
decrease in wages as compared to those reemployed in their pre-displacement occu-
pation. This result is in line with the literature on  skill regimes which suggests that, 
in highly standardized  vocational training systems such as the Swiss system, work-
ers transit smoothly between jobs within the same sector. This outcome results from 
workers acquiring sector-speciﬁ c skills rather than solely ﬁ rm-speciﬁ c skills during 
vocational education. 
12  There is a correlation between the outcome equation and the selection equation (rho = 0.78) and 
accordingly the Wald test is not signiﬁ cant. 
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 Fig. 7.4  Coefﬁ cients for an OLS regression for wage change (in %) between the job before and 
after displacement. N = 341. Note: We also ran models where we entered plant as a control vari-
able. The results were not affected by this variable. Signiﬁ cance levels: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** 
p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the plant level. Reading example: For each year in age, the 




 With respect to education our ﬁ ndings do not conﬁ rm our expectations. The 
effects are small and statistically non-signiﬁ cant. This suggests that while low levels 
of education reduce the chances of  reemployment , they do not increase the risk of 
wage loss relative to intermediate or high levels of education. 
 Finally,  tenure reveals signiﬁ cant effects but they run in the opposite direction to 
our prediction and the link is not linear. In order to test the robustness of this effect, 
we run a model without the age variable. However, the result is similar with small 
positive but signiﬁ cant effects for 2–5 years of tenure and 6–10 years of tenure. 
Consequently, our hypotheses with respect to education and tenure cannot be sup-
ported by these ﬁ ndings. 
 Overall, we ﬁ nd less support for the  human capital theory which explains work-
ers’ wage losses after job separations as a consequence of lower returns on their 
skills. With respect to the ﬁ nding that long spells of unemployment considerably 
affect workers’ wage changes, it is not clear whether this result is due to a skill 
depreciation effect, a signaling effect or a selection effect. But since the other ﬁ nd-
ings – in particular with regard to education and type of collar – provide little evi-
dence for human capital mechanisms being at work, signaling  theor y is perhaps a 
better explanation. The fact that we ﬁ nd a negative wage effect for workers with 
surnames originating from non-EU countries may also point to this mechanism. 
With respect to nationality and ethnic background, it has indeed been shown for 
Switzerland that simply changing the name (and thus implicitly the nationality or 
migration background) on a job application negatively affects the job seekers’ 
chances of being invited to an interview (Fibbi et al.  2003 ). 
 If we compare our results with earlier ﬁ ndings, Carneiro and Portugal ( 2006 : 18) 
also ﬁ nd that the duration of joblessness has an important effect on earning losses. 
They report that this factor explains about a third of the losses. But in contrast to our 
analysis they ﬁ nd that job  tenure even explains a larger proportion of the wage 
losses, namely about 50 %. Other authors have pointed out that changes from the 
 manufacturing sector to the service sector are particularly costly. Cha and Morgan 
( 2010 : 1144) reveal wage losses of 35 % for workers who changed from the second-
ary to the tertiary sector. These ﬁ ndings are not conﬁ rmed by our analysis for 
Switzerland. An additional descriptive analysis that simply compares the average 
wage changes for workers reemployed in manufacturing and the services reveals 
almost no difference between “stayers” and “switchers”. 
 Only our result that change of occupation is a more important determinant than 
change of sector seems to correspond to earlier ﬁ ndings. Haynes et al. ( 2002 : 250) 
report that individuals with a sector tenure of 10 years lost around 1 % of their 
wages when switching sector while workers with an occupation tenure of 15 years 
lost 15 % of their wages when changing occupation. While we also ﬁ nd that change 
of occupation is more relevant than change of sector, the effects for the workers in 
our sample are much smaller. 
7.4 Determinants of Wage Change
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7.5  Conclusion 
 The analysis of the reemployed workers’ wages has revealed the costs of job loss 
that workers experience even if they are reemployed. On average, they are con-
fronted with moderate wage losses if we compare their pre- and post-displacement 
wages. However, the full amount of wage losses can only be assessed if we compare 
these losses with the counterfactual outcome – the outcome of workers who did not 
lose their jobs. Comparing the wage losses of the displaced workers with the wage 
development of non-displaced workers from the Swiss Household Panel, we ﬁ nd 
that the full losses of displaced workers amount on average to 6 %. As discussed in 
more detail in Chap.  2 , the control and the treatment group are alike in terms of age 
but not in terms of education and sex. The  control group contains a larger share of 
women and of workers with higher levels of education. Our estimation of the coun-
terfactual outcome may therefore overestimate the wage losses since our analysis 
suggests that men and higher skilled workers experience stronger wage losses after 
job displacement than women and lower skilled workers. At the same time, since 
the control and treatment group are alike with respect to the variable that affects 
wage development most strongly, age – minus one percent for each year of age –, 
the counterfactual outcome may not be too strongly misspeciﬁ ed. 
 Our expectations that high-tenured workers, low-qualiﬁ ed workers and workers 
who were reemployed in another sector or occupation experience the highest wage 
losses cannot be corroborated. But we ﬁ nd that long unemployment durations are 
linked to wages losses, which is in line with our hypothesis H6. However, wage 
changes are most strongly affected by age. Reemployed workers of the oldest 
cohort, the over 60s, are much more likely to experience wage losses than the other 
age groups – even after controlling for other socio-demographic factors. On aver-
age, younger workers experienced substantial increases in their hourly wages (+8 % 
for those under 30), whereas reemployed older  worker s had to put up with substan-
tial wage cuts (−14 % for those aged 55–59, −17 % for those aged 60–65). Older 
workers thus do not only have bleaker  reemployment chances after a plant closure, 
but they also have to accept substantial wage losses. In contrast, the great majority 
of younger workers experience successful  occupational transition s after plant clo-
sure which tend to be accompanied by increased wages. 
 In this chapter we have shown that there is huge variation in how wages are 
affected by non-self-inﬂ icted job loss. Although the average wage loss is an impor-
tant number to estimate because it allows for comparison with studies from other 
countries, it provides only limited information. From a scientiﬁ c point of view it is 
important to understand how different worker subgroups are affected. This allows 
receiving a better understanding of the mechanisms underlying workers’  wage 
losses . As workers’ wage curve tends to steadily increase during the ﬁ rst decades of 
their  career s, it usually slightly declines towards the end of the career. Finding that 
the older  worker s in our study are confronted with the highest wages is thus not 
surprising at ﬁ rst glance. However, the decreases are strong – even if we consider 
only those who returned to a job –, which seems to give a hint that other  mechanisms 
7 Wages
141
are at work. The large wage losses of older workers seem to be an indicator for the 
low interest  employer s take in  hiring them. 
 The consequences on an individual level are that these workers have to put up 
with lower wages and lower old-age pension savings. Lower wages may be less of 
a problem as children, if there are any, are no longer likely to be ﬁ nancially depen-
dent on their parents. In contrast, substantial reductions in old-age pension savings 
may leave workers with long-lasting hardship and deprive them for instance from 
making life-changing investments in their health. From a societal point of view los-
ing one’s job – in particular at the end of the career – is a trigger of economic 
inequalities, leaving displaced workers with substantial economic and social disad-
vantages as compared to non-displaced workers. 
 Open Access  This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 
International License ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ), which permits use, duplica-
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